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Abstract
This study investigates the optimal nature of law making under uncertainty.
I focus on a case in which a harmful activity will be subjected to some regulatory
measures (a standard, exposure to liability, or a corrective tax). The benets
and costs of precaution are ex-ante uncertain, and this places a risk burden on
both injurers and victims. The optimal policy should, at the same time, strike
a balance between benets and costs of the measures, and attenuate the ex-ante
risk. Whether measures should be made stronger or softer depends on the size
and the sign of the shocks a¤ecting the parties (positive or negative) and their
disposition towards risk. With corrective taxes, it also depends on the elasticity
of precautions with respect to the tax rate.
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NON TECHNICAL SUMMARY
From an economic standpoint, legal change is characterized by two distinctive fea-
tures. On the one hand, it is largely unpredictable, as it is a¤ected by a myriad of
evolving factors, including political preferences, and economic and technological condi-
tions. On the other, it is to a great extent uninsurable, as insurance companies tend
not to cover losses due to variations in the law. The consequence is that legal change
imposes costly risk on the people a¤ected.
Take the case of environmental law. We know that climate change will call for drastic
policy interventions, aimed at reducing the impact of the increased world temperature.
The timing and the scope of these measures remain highly uncertain, as they depend,
in addition to political preferences, on the evolution of the climate system and on
technological breakthroughs. Older technologies might be outlawed, entire industries
might disappear. At the moment, however, it is hard to make predictions about the
path the law will actually take, and this places a huge dose of uninsurable risk on the
shoulders of the companies and the individuals a¤ected. Should this uncertainty impact
on policymaking? If yes, what shape should policymaking take to mitigate the cost of
uncertainty?
In this paper, I consider a specic tool that the government can employ to reduce
the risk that legal change imposes on a¤ected parties. This tool, called "attenuation,"
requires that the government introduces an insurance element in its policy making.
Specically, policy making should try and smooth out the welfare level of the parties
a¤ected. Measures that impose a costly burden on the parties should be made softer if
parties have been hit by a negative shock, and they should be made harder if parties
have been hit by a positive shock. Several applications of this tool are discussed.
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This search for static security - in the law and elsewhere - is misguided.
The fact is that security can only be achieved through constant change ...
Justice W.O. Douglas, Stare Decisis (1949).
1 Introduction
From an economic standpoint, legal change is characterized by two distinctive features.
On the one hand, it is largely unpredictable, as it is a¤ected by a myriad of evolving
factors, including political preferences and economic and technological conditions. On
the other, it is to a great extent uninsurable, as insurance companies tend not to cover
losses due to variations in the law (see Shavell (2014b)). The consequence is that legal
change imposes costly risk on the people a¤ected.
Take the case of environmental law. We know that climate change will call for drastic
policy interventions, aimed at reducing the impact of the increased world temperature.
The timing and the scope of these measures remain highly uncertain, as they depend,
in addition to political preferences, on the evolution of the climate system and on
technological breakthroughs.1 Older technologies might be outlawed, entire industries
might disappear. At the moment, however, it is hard to make predictions about the
path the law will actually take, and this places a huge dose of uninsurable risk on the
shoulders of the companies and the individuals a¤ected. Should this uncertainty impact
on policymaking? If yes, what shape should policymaking take to mitigate the cost of
uncertainty?
This article addresses this fundamental normative issue by considering a traditional
externality setup, in which an activity causes harm with a probability that depends on
the precautions taken by some injurers.2 Other parties, called victims, bear the risk of
1Predictions about the climate trajectory are known to be plagued by extensive scientic uncer-
tainty. Uncertainty also pertains to technological advancement, especially in the elds with strong
environmental bearing like hydropower, solar PV, smart grids, battery storage, electric vehicles, con-
centrated solar power, biomass supply, biofuels, carbon capture and storage. Estimates of the marginal
cost of reducing a ton a carbon dioxide in year 2050, under a +1.5 scenario, range from $245 to $14,300
(see IPCC (2018), p. 152).
2As I will explain below, my paper heavily builds on Shavell (2014b).
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harm. At time zero, there is uncertainty about the actual probability of harm and the
cost of precaution. This uncertainty will unfold at a later date (time 1), when a specic
policy measure (e.g., a regulation mandating specic precautions) will be enacted. At
time zero, both injurers and victims are subject to uninsurable risk, since they cannot
predict with certainty the cost of complying with the regulation and the likelihood of
harm. I investigate the impact of this uncertainty on social welfare and study how the
policy measure should be designed to mitigate the risk burden of the a¤ected parties.
In addressing these issues, I will expand on the results of Shavell (2014b). In his
insightful contribution, he analyses a simplied version of the problem above (the ac-
tivity at hand can only be harmful or not) and focuses on the ex-ante risk borne by
the injurers. He shows that the government can reduce this risk by committing to "at-
tenuate" the new policy measure: by making it less stringent than otherwise optimal,
the government reduces the prospective compliance costs for the injurers and provides
them with partial insurance. The attenuation of the policy measure provides a rst-
order reduction in risk with only a second-order loss in terms of distorting the ex-post
optimum.
I extend Shavells fundamental results in two directions. First, I consider the possi-
bility that parties are a¤ected both by negative (as in Shavells original contribution)
and positive shocks. The latter case arises, for example, when the costs of precaution
turn out to be smaller than expected, possibly because of a major breakthrough in pre-
vention technology. Second, and more importantly, I consider the impact of uncertainty
on the victimswelfare. Di¤erently from injurers, who face uncertainty about the cost of
complying with the new measure, victims face uncertainty about the ensuing probability
of harm. Such an uncertainty, by itself, does not reduce the welfare level of the victims.3
By using an intuitive analytical approach, based on certainty equivalents, I am able to
decompose the risk borne by the victims in two parts: the ex-ante risk (associated with
the uncertainty about the probability of harm) and the ex-post risk (associated with
3Technically, victims face a "compound lottery," i.e. a lottery whose prizes are lottery tickets. For
a rational agent, all that matters is the compound probability of winning: "... only algebra, not human
behavior, is involved in this denition" (Samuelson (1952)).
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the prospect of harm, with a given probability). I show that e¢ ciency considerations
induce the policy maker to mitigate both the ex-ante and the ex-post risk. In fact, if
the ex-ante risk of the victims is reduced, the expected amount of resources devoted to
precaution goes down (and this is surely welfare improving if injurers are not averse to
risk). The reduction in the ex-ante risk can be obtained by requesting injurers to take
additional precautionary measures when the probability of harm turns out to be high,
and fewer precautionary measures when the probability of harm turns out to be low.4
In general, the policy makers should pander to the ex-ante risk borne by both injurers
and victims. So, the optimal attenuation policy might entail a stronger or a weaker
measure than suggested by ex-post cost-benet analysis. As I will show, the direction
of the policy change will ultimately depend on a simple condition that accounts for:
i) sign and size of the shocks parties are subject to, and ii) their disposition towards
risk. For example, if all parties are equally averse to risk and injurers turn out to be
particularly negatively a¤ected, the optimal policy calls for a laxer measure (to reduce
their compliance costs). Conversely, if victims are particularly negatively a¤ected, the
optimal policy calls for a stricter measure (to reduce the probability of harm).
Following Shavell (2014b), I apply the attenuation logic to three policy tools: 1)
a regulation imposing a standard of behavior to limit harmful e¤ects (this could be a
command and control limit on emissions, a technology standard, or a negligence stan-
dard), 2) liability for the harm caused (a policy that enables victims to claim damages
for the harm su¤ered), and 3) corrective taxation, i.e., taxes or subsidies encouraging
the adoption of preventive measures.
With respect to regulation, I show that the standard should be lowered if: i) injurers
are subject to a negative shock and victims to a positive shock, ii) both injurers and
victims are subject to a negative shock, and victims are better able to take additional
risk, iii) both injurers and victims are subject to a positive shock, and injurers are in
a better position to take additional risk. A similar result applies to liability for harm.
Damages should be reduced (with respect to the otherwise optimal level) if conditions
4Shavell (2014b) focuses on the case in which victims are either risk neutral or they can purchase
insurance at a fair premium. So, the e¤ect mentioned above does not arise.
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equivalent to those listed above apply. I also show that, in contrast to the classic result
of Shavell (1982), here, optimal damages can exceed harm (when the injurer is subject
to a positive shock).
The results for the taxation case are notably di¤erent.5 Here, an increase in the
marginal tax rate a¤ects the payo¤ of the injurers exclusively by means of variations in
their tax payments. The increase in the marginal rate a¤ects the victims through the
reduction in harm brought about by the additional precautions exerted by the injurers.
If precautions are very sensitive to the tax rate, the attenuation policy should target
the victims.
While the three tools mentioned above are equally e¢ cient when parties are indif-
ferent to risk, they are not equivalent when parties are averse to risk, as I assume in
this article. I show that when injurers are nearly risk neutral and victims risk averse,
liability for harm is the most e¢ cient tool. If victims are nearly risk neutral and in-
jurers are risk averse, regulation and taxation fare better under a weak comonotonicity
condition.
Literature review. My contribution touches on two distinct strands of the literature.
Legal change. One of the central tenets of recent law and economics literature is that
parties who are negatively a¤ected by a policy change should not be compensated.6 This
perspective, notably advanced by Graetz (1977) and Kaplow (1986), is based on the
idea that the government is in no better position than private companies in providing
insurance to the parties. As no government insurance is provided against adverse market
changes, no relief should be granted to those who are adversely a¤ected by legal change.
This view is postulated on the premise that policy making is the outcome of proper
balancing of benets and costs of change, so the costs borne by the parties are part and
parcel of a socially desirable legal change.7
5Shavell (2014b) considers non-linear taxes that mimic liability law. I focus instead on linear taxes,
in line with the current policy debate (see Sec. 5 below).
6The early literature, building on the contributions of Michelman (1967) and Feldstein (1976),
argued instead that losses caused by unilateral acts of the policy maker (such as a property or a
regulatory taking) have to be compensated, in order to not frustrate legitimate expectations and to
promote reliance on the law.
7The latter proposition is in line with the standard e¢ ciency-based approach of law and economics,
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While Kaplows argument that insurance should be provided by the private market
is theoretically convincing, it runs against a major practical obstacle: insurance policies
do not normally cover losses resulting from changes in the law (see the ample discus-
sion in Shavell (2014b)). This puzzling fact has attracted recurrent scrutiny. Several
explanations have been provided, including moral hazard and adverse selection (Blume
and Rubinfeld (1984)), pricing di¢ culties (Masur and Nash (2010)), and the correlated
nature of the losses (Shavell (2014b)).
In current policy making, the lack of private insurance has originated an array of
mitigation policies aimed at providing "transition relief" to adversely a¤ected parties.
These policies, temporary or permanent, include specic exemptions, waivers, subsi-
dies, grandfathering, and phase-ins.8 Following Shavell (2014b), I investigate the case
in which "transition relief" is directly incorporated in the policy change. Policy mak-
ing includes an insurance component aimed at smoothing out the welfare level of the
parties.9
Policy making under uncertainty. Over the last decades, great e¤ort has been ex-
erted to understand the implications of uncertainty on policy making. An inuential
literature, inspired by Weitzman (1974), investigates optimal emissions abatement pol-
icy when both marginal costs and marginal benets of abatement are uncertain.10 In
this paper, I also assume uncertainty about benets and costs. However, in sharp con-
trast to the aforementioned literature, I assume that policy is state-dependent (it is
which follows cost-benet analysis in positing that a policy move is desirable when compensation of
losing parties is just "feasible." Compensation itself is not required, as it pertains to the province of
equity.
8See, among others, Levmore (1999), Shaviro (2000), Nash and Revesz (2007), Masur and Nash
(2010), Shavell (2014a), and Trebilcock (2014). These authors defend transition relief on the basis of
a variety of arguments, including e¢ ciency, incentives for socially desirable investments, governmental
legitimacy, and fairness.
9I do not investigate the relative desirability of the attenuation policy vis-à-vis other relief policies.
If costless direct income transfers were available, clearly a direct tax/subsidy policy would dominate.
I regard this option as not practicable, as it would imply that, anytime a standard is changed, a¤ected
parties (both injurers and victims) either receive a tax or a subsidy.
10Weitzmans contribution is part of the standard environmental economics toolkit. For a concise
introduction, see Aldy and Viscusi (2014). A di¤erent strand of the literature focuses on the uncertainty
due to random "mistakes" in the enforcement of the law (see, for instance, Kolstad et al. (1990)). The
presence of such mistakes would not change the substance of my arguments.
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applied when uncertainty has unfolded). It follows that the implication of uncertainty
is not a policy mistake (e.g., the standard is ine¢ ciently set), but costly risk (risk averse
parties bear the cost of not knowing in which direction uncertainty will unfold).11 So,
policy decision making will be guided by the partiesdisposition towards risk, as well
as the shape of marginal costs and benets of precaution.
The attenuation logic requires that the outcome of traditional cost-benet analy-
sis be amended so as to include some "stabilization" factors, aimed at containing the
variance of the partiess welfare levels.12 In environmental policy, similar concerns have
recently let to the proposal of specic mechanisms aimed at reducing the volatility as-
sociates with emission control policy (such mechanisms include safety valves, allowance
banking, and collars).13 The policy debate has so far focussed on the costs that uncer-
tainty places on those who sink resources in emission abatement. My results take both
sides of the "market" into account, and highlight the value of attenuating also the risk
faced by the victims.
Note, nally, that in contrast to much of the literature on legal change that focuses
on the uncertainty about the policy measure itself, my paper focuses on the fundamental
uncertainty that triggers the policy decision (uncertainty about the costs and benets
of the measure). From this perspective, "inaction" can create greater risk for society
than "action" (hence the opening quote). Newfound harms or new terrorist threats
represent negative shocks that should be mitigated by means of a tough policy stance
- to an extent that goes beyond momentary balancing of benets and costs. In this
sense, this paper provides some justication to the over-reaction that normally follows
11My model does not deal with the costs of irreversibly that would arise if prevention measures were
taken before uncertainty unfolds and could not be reversed for free at a later time. Irreversibility and
learning call for delay in law making (see, for instance, Parisi and Fon (2009), ch. 3). Shavell (2008)
investigates the impact of retrotting costs on optimal prevention policy. Dari-Mattiacci and Franzoni
(2014) focus on the adoption costs borne by the injurers when the prevention technology changes.
12In most countries, cost-benet analysis is supplemented by an evaluation of distributional e¤ects
(see, for example, EPA (2016) and EC (2017)). This paper argues that, for e¢ ciency purposes, cost-
benet analysis should account for the negative or positive shocks parties have been subject to. To be
sure, attenuation does not promote redistribution across individuals but across contingencies.
13See, for instance, Aldy and Viscusi (2014), Aldy (2017), and references therein.
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public scares, in the vicious circle at the core of Justice Breyers concerns (see Breyer
(2009)).
The paper proceeds as follows. Sections 2 o¤ers a simple illustration of the atten-
uation principle. Section 3 deals with the case in which the policy maker decides a
standard of behavior for the injurers. Section 4 analyses the case in which potential in-
jurers face liability for the harm caused. The policy maker decides the level of damages
to be awarded to the victims (these damages can under- or over-compensate victims).
Section 5 deals with corrective taxation. The tax payment, which can be negative (i.e.,
a subsidy), decreases with the level of precaution taken. It shares the features of a
standard emission fee (such as a carbon fee). The three tools are compared in Section
6. Section 7 concludes.
2 The attenuation principle
Let us consider a basic illustration of the attenuation principle. Suppose that an injurer
can take precautionary measures that reduce the probability that n victims su¤er harm
of magnitude h: Let us further assume that the cost of precaution is ex-ante uncertain
(is might depend on a technological breakthrough). It might turn out to be high, c0 (x) ;
or low, c1 (x) ; with c00 (x) > c
0
1 (x) for all precaution levels x  0: The probability of
harm is p (x) ; with p0 (x) < 0: Since the victims are risk averse, the cost of harm for
each of them is not p (x)h; but: ` (x) > p (x)h: In fact, ` (x) is the amount that each
victim would be willing to pay to get full insurance against harm (it includes a risk
premium).
The policy maker decides which precautionary measures should be taken (a standard
of care), once the uncertainty about precaution costs has unfolded. Suppose that the
marginal cost of precaution turns out to be high. The standard xc0 prescribed by
conventional cost-benet analysis is the one that equates marginal cost and marginal
benets (the reduction in the cost of harm for the victims): c0 (xc0) =  n`0 (xc0) : One
dollar invested in precaution should reduce the cost of harm for the victims by one
dollar. Figure 1 illustrates.
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Fig. 1. Optimal attenuation.
If the marginal cost of precaution turns out to low, the standard suggested by cost-
benet analysis is xc1: Note that, ex-ante, before the cost of precaution is known, both
the injurer and the victims are subject to uncertainty. The injurer does not know
whether she will bear cost c0 (xc0) or c1 (x
c
1) : The victims do not know whether they
will face cost of harm n` (xc0) or n` (x
c
1), with n` (x
c
0) > n` (x
c
1) (to x ideas).
Let us consider the e¤ect of a variation in xc0: By reducing the standard x
c
0; the policy
maker invites the injurer to forgo precautionary measures that are more benecial than
costly. However, the resulting distortion - the small shaded triangle - is negligible. What
is substantial, instead, is the impact on the size of the risk borne by the parties: the
ex-ante uncertainty faced by the injurer decreases (since the wedge between c0 (x0) and
c1 (x1) decreases), while, symmetrically, the ex-ante uncertainty faced by the victims
increases. The net e¤ect is not null, because parties are likely to have a di¤erent capacity
to bear additional risk (because they might have di¤erent attitudes towards risk and
because the size of the risk they already bear is di¤erent - in general, the higher the
risk already borne, the more costly the addition of risk). So, if the injurer is less able
to bear additional risk, the standard should decrease, and the other way around if the
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victims are less able to bear additional risk.
On the basis of similar considerations, the standard x1 should also be be modied.
Here, however, the direction of the change is the opposite of the previous one: x1 should
decrease if, and only if, the injurer is better able to bear additional risk.
A second order approximation, in which I and V are, respectively, the degrees of
risk aversion of injurer and victims, yields this simple rule:
Optimal attenuation
If I [c0 (xc0)  c1 (xc1)] > V [` (xc0)  ` (xc1)] ; xc0 should be decreased and xc1 increased.
If I [c0 (xc0)  c1 (xc1)] < V [` (xc0)  ` (xc1)] ; xc0 should be increased and xc1 decreased.
Note that this rule is una¤ected by the numerosity of the victims (numerosity a¤ects
instead the level of the conventional standards).
The precise amount by which xc0 and x
c
1 should change depends on the degree of risk
aversion of the parties and the size of the risk they bear. Additionally, if the marginal
cost and marginal harm curves are highly elastic (marginal costs and marginal harm
are nearly constant), the cost of distorting the conventional policy is smaller, and the
optimal distortion is larger.
More generally, when both harm and costs are uncertain, the direction of the dis-
tortion will depend on whether parties are subject to positive or negative shocks. For
example, if costs turn out to be high and the probability of harm low, a reduction in
the standard is benecial to both the injurer and the victims.
 Illustration. Let us consider the case in which it is discovered that some common
food has been heavily contaminated (the probability of harm jumps upwards). The
public authority imposes specic containment measures on the industry operators -
such as destruction of inventories, removal from shelves, extra monitoring - to reduce
the risk to the public. Such measures represent a cost for those operators but o¤er
some reassurance to the population. Suppose that operators are mostly large companies
indi¤erent to risk. Here, an e¢ cient safety policy requires that containment measures
are intensied beyond the level that ordinary cost-benet analysis suggests.14
14If rms and consumers were tied by a contractual relationship, such additional containment mea-
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3 Regulation of behavior
Let us consider the case in which both the costs and the probability of harm associated
with a certain activity are uncertain. They will only be known at a future date. At that
date, when uncertainty has unravelled, a suitable standard of behavior will be applied.
The standard will be enforced either through pecuniary and criminal sanctions, or
simple negligence law.
With probability q; the cost of taking precautions is c0 (x) and the probability that
victims su¤er harm is p0 (x) ; with c00 (x) > 0 for x > 0; c
0
0 (0) = 0; limx0!1 c
0
0 (x) =1;
c000 (x)  0; p00 (x) < 0; and p000 (x)  0:
With probability 1   q; the cost of taking precautions is c1 (x) and the probability
that victims su¤er harm is p1 (x) ; where c1 (x) and p1 (x) meet the regularity conditions
listed above.
The magnitude of harm is xed and equal to h for each victim.15 There are nV
identical victims and nI identical injurers. The policy maker sets the standards x0
and x1 before uncertainty has been resolved and commits not to change them.16 So,
the time line unfolds as follows: i) the policymaker decides how to x the standards,
ii) uncertainty about costs and benets of precaution unravels, iii) the standards are
enforced and with some probability victims su¤er harm.
Agents maximize their expected utility and the policymaker pursues Pareto e¢ -
ciency (in other words, the policymaker maximizes the expected utility that agents can
get from this situation). In line with this articles introductory observations, I assume
that insurance is not available. So, injurers are subject to the risk associated with the
variability of precaution costs, while victims are subject to the risk of harm, with a
probability that is itself ex-ante uncertain.
sures would be part of the e¢ cient contract.
15Results can be easily extended to the case in which also victims invest in precautions (bilateral ac-
cidents), precautions a¤ect the magnitude of harm (instead of its probability), and ex-ante uncertainty
does not take a binary shape.
16This assumption presumes that the policymaker adopts a decision rule that accounts for the
contingency under which decisions are made (positive or negative shocks a¤ecting the parties). In the
authors view, this feature is in line with actual policy making: the introduction of costly regulations
is often delayed when industries are experiencing a downturn.
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We can now turn to the optimal policy. As noted in the introduction, the policy
maker will nd it optimal to deviate from the prescriptions of conventional cost-benet
analysis. In order to see in which direction policy changes, let us rst analyze the "con-
ventional" standards, that is the standards that are optimal ex-post, when uncertainty
has unravelled.17
Let us suppose that state 0 has occurred. Let us consider the payo¤ of the victims.
Given the level of precaution taken by the injurers, the expected utility of each victim
is dEUV0 (x0) = (1  p0 (x0)) v (yV ) + p0 (x0) v (yV   h) ; (1)
where v (y) is the victims utility function, with v0 (y) > 0 and v00 (y)  0; and yV is his
income level.
For the sake of the analysis, let us calculate the certainty equivalent of dEUV0 (x0) ;
i.e., the amount yV   `0 (x0) such that
v (yV   `0 (x0)) =dEUV0 (x0) : (2)
`0 (x0) is amount that each victim is willing to pay to get full insurance against harm.
It represents the "cost of harm" for the victim. The cost of harm can be divided in
two components: the expected loss p0 (x0)h and a residual part, called risk premium,
which accounts for the loss due to the uncertainty about the occurrence of harm:
`0 (x0) = p0 (x0)h+RP
V
0 (x0) ;
Note that the risk premium is larger if the agent is more averse to risk (i.e., if v is
subject to a concave monotone transformation). One can easily see that if the standard
of care x0 increases, the probability of harm decreases and the cost of harm `0 (x0)
decreases. If h increases, `0 (x0) increases.
We can now turn to the optimal determination of the standard in the conventional
17Shavell (2014b) uses the same denition. However, since in his model victims can buy insurance
once uncertainty has unravelled; his conventional standards coincide with the standards that would
emerge if all parties were risk neutral.
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case. In Appendix A1, I show that the (ex-post) optimal policy can be obtained by
maximizing the sum the certainty equivalents of the a¤ected parties. This procedure
is fully equivalent to the tradition approach, based on the maximization of expected
utilities. Ex-post social welfare is therefore:
cW0 (x0) = nI [yI   c0 (x0)] + nV [yV   `0 (x0)] ;
where yI is the income of each injurer. Note that here injurers are subject to no
uncertainty (they have to pay c0 (x0) for sure).
The optimal conventional standard xc0 must satisfy cW 00 (xc0) = 0; and thus:
nI c
0
0 (x
c
0) =  nV `00 (xc0) : (3)
Eq. (3) is a classic application of cost-benet analysis to risk prevention: an additional
dollar spent in prevention should reduce the cost of harm for the victims by one dollar.18
Note that the conventional standard xc0 increases if nV increases or nI decreases:
social marginal costs increase if the number of injurers is larger, social marginal benets
increase if the number of potential victims is larger.
Similarly, the optimal conventional standard in state 1, xc1;must satisfycW 01 (xc1) = 0,
and thus:
nI c
0
1 (x
c
1) =  nV `01 (xc1) : (4)
Note that xc1 might be larger or smaller than x
c
0:
Let us consider now the optimal standards from an ex-ante perspective, before un-
certainty about costs and benets of precaution has unravelled. By going through steps
similar to those above (see Appendix A1), we get that the ex-ante cost of precaution for
the injurers (i.e., the amount that they would be willing to spend to get full insurance
18In general, we do not know if risk aversion calls for a higher or lower standard, since RPV0 (x0) can
increase or decrease with the probability of harm - see Shavell (1982). Risk aversion calls for a higher
standard if the probability of harm is "su¢ ciently small" (e.g., if it is less than 1/2 under quadratic
utility). See Jullien et al. (1999).
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against precaution costs) is
`ex anteI (x0; x1) = qc0 (x0) + (1  q) c1 (x1) +RI :
The ex-ante cost of precaution includes the expected costs plus a risk premium RI due
to ex-ante uncertainty. RI goes up if the wedge between c0 (x0) and c1 (x1) increases,
and if the injurer is more averse to risk.19
The ex-ante cost of harm for the victims can be written as:
`ex anteV (x0; x1) = q`0 (x0) + (1  q) `1 (x1) +RV : (5)
The ex-ante cost of harm includes the expected cost of harm and a risk premium due
to the ex-ante uncertainty about the probability of harm. RV increases if the wedge
between `0 (x0) and `1 (x1) increases, and if the victims are more averse to risk (given
`1 and `0, RV increases if v is subject to a concave monotone transformation).
We are now ready to calculate the ex-ante optimal policy. The optimal standards
should maximize ex-ante social welfare (again based on certainty equivalents):
W ex ante (x0; x1) = nI

yI   `ex anteI (x0; x1)

+ nV

yV   `ex anteV (x0; x1)

= q [nI (yI   c0 (x0))  nV (y0   `0 (x0))]
+ (1  q) [nI (yI   c1 (x1))  nV (yI   `1 (x1))]  nIRI   nVRV :
Thus,
W ex ante (x0; x1) = qcW0 (x0) + (1  q)cW1 (x1)  nIRI   nVRV : (6)
Ex-ante social welfare is equal to the expected ex-post social welfare minus the risk pre-
miums of injurers and victims due to ex-ante uncertainty. Equation (6) shows that the
ex-ante optimal policy must di¤er from the ex-post optimal policy, since the latter does
19Note that also rms tend to display risk aversion (and purchase insurance, when available). Several
explanations for this fact have been provided, including the cost of bankruptcy (which leads rms to
avoid very adverse outcomes), the cost of external funds (which might be needed in adverse states),
asymmetric information (the rms behavior reects the risk aversion of directors and managers whose
remuneration depends on the rms performance), a convex tax schedule, and debt overhang (the
underinvestment caused by debt can be reduced if risks are managed).
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not account for the cost of ex-ante uncertainty. In deciding the optimal standards, the
policy maker should balance the impact on ex-post social welfare (i.e. the deadweight
loss of the distortion), the impact on the uncertainty burden of the injurers, and the
impact on the uncertainty burden of the victims.
The following result tells us in which direction conventional standards should be
modied.
Proposition 1 Regulation of behavior.
a) The standard xc0 should be increased if, and only if,
@RI
@c0 (xc0)
<
@RV
@`0 (xc0)
:
b) The standard xc1 should be increased if, and only if,
@RI
@c1 (xc1)
<
@RV
@`1 (xc1)
:
Proof. See Appendix A1.
The optimal attenuation policy requires that the conventional standards be modied
to mitigate the ex-ante uncertainty borne by injurers and victims. The expression
guiding the direction of change is very simple, since it depends on whether the impact
of a one-dollar increase in the cost of precaution on the uncertainty burden of an injurer
is greater or less than the impact of a one-dollar increase in the cost of harm on the
uncertainty burden of a victim.
Note that the inequalities of Proposition 1 can be easily veried if injurers and
victims are subject to shocks of opposite sign. Let us focus on x0: If injurers are
subject to a positive shock (c0 (xc0) < c1 (x
c
1)) and victims are subject to a negative shock
(`0 (x
c
0) > `1 (x
c
1)) ; then
@RI
@c0(xc0)
< 0 and @RV
@`0(xc0)
> 0 : an increase in the conventional
standard xc0 reduces the ex-ante risk premiums of both injurers and victims.
The direction of change cannot be determined in an obvious manner when injurers
and victims are subject to shocks of the same sign. In such situations, the direction of
change will depend on which party is in an a better position to bear additional (ex-ante)
risk. This will in general depend on: i) the size of the shock (that is jc0 (xc0)  c1 (xc1)j
and j`0 (xc0)  `1 (xc1)j); ii) the partiesdisposition towards risk.
Note that what determines the direction of change is not the aggregate size of the
risk, but the individual size (the impact of an increase in aggregate risk depends on
how much risk each agent is already bearing).
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Proposition 1 determines the optimal direction of change with respect to the con-
ventional standards. The precise magnitude by which they should be modied depends
on the degree of risk aversion of the parties and the size of the risk they bear. Addition-
ally, if the marginal cost and the marginal benet curves are highly inelastic (marginal
costs and marginal benets are nearly constant), the cost of distorting the conventional
policy is smaller, and the optimal modication is larger.
4 Liability for harm
Let us now consider the case in which injurers are liable for the harm caused. The policy
maker decides the level of damages to be paid to each victim (d0 if state 0 occurs, d1
if state 1 occurs). Each injurer faces n = nV =nI victims. Damages are independent
of the level of care taken (i.e., strict liability applies), and liability is clearly assigned
to the responsible injurer. Damages can undercompensate (e.g., pain and su¤ering are
not included, or caps are imposed) or overcompensate (they are generously calculated
or they include punitive elements). Each victim su¤ers harm h with probability either
p0 (x) or p1 (x) :
Let us start again with the conventional levels of damages, i.e. the damages that
would be optimal ex-post, when uncertainty about the precaution costs and the prob-
ability of harm has unfolded: Let us focus on state 0. The cost of harm `I0 (x0) for the
injurer is
`I0 (x0) = c0 (x0) + p0 (x0)nd0 +RP
I
0 (nd0) ;
where RP I0 (nd0) is the risk premium attendant with the risk of bearing liability nd0
with probability p0 (x0).20
The level of precaution xI0 is decided by the injurer to minimize her cost of harm
(precautions are costly but reduce prospective liability).
The cost of harm for each victim is:
`V0
 
xI0

= p0
 
xI0

(h  d0) +RP V0 (h  d0) ;
20Harms are assumed to be perfectly correlated. Optimal liability law with imperfectly correlated
harms is studied in Franzoni (2016). Correlation a¤ects the size of the risk premium:
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where RP V0 (h  d0) is the risk premium attendant with the prospect of bearing un-
compensated harm h d0 with probability p0
 
xI0

: The victims cost of harm increases
with h  d0 and with p0
 
xI0

.
The optimal conventional policy can be found by maximizing ex-post social welfare
(per injurer):
W SL0 (d0) = yI   `I0
 
xI0

+ n

yV   `V0
 
xI0

:
Thus, conventional damages dc0 solve:
W SL0 (d
c
0)
@d0
=  @`
I
0
 
xI0

@d0
  n@`
V
0
 
xI0

@d0
= 0: (7)
Note that damages a¤ect both the level of precaution taken by the injurer and the
allocation of risk between the parties (see Appendix A2).
With risk averse victims, optimal (conventional) damages are under-compensatory:
dc0 < h (as rst proved by Shavell (1982)). The intuition is the following: when damages
are compensatory (dc0 = h); the injurer fully internalizes the negative impact she exerts
on the victims, so incentives to take precautions are properly set. The allocation of risk,
however, is not optimal, because all the risk is borne by the injurer. The allocation of
risk can be improved at the margin, with a negligible e¤ect on incentives, by reducing
the level of damages and by shifting a small amount of the loss on the victims. The
impact on the risk burden of the victims is negligible (for small losses, people behave
as if they were risk neutral), while the impact on the risk burden of the injurer is
substantial.21
Similar denitions and results apply to state 1.
Let us consider the optimal policy before uncertainty unravels. The ex-ante cost of
harm for injurer and victims are, respectively,
`ex anteI (d0; d1) = q`
I
0
 
xI0

+ (1  q) `I1
 
xI1

+RI ;
`ex anteV (d0; d1) = q`
V
0
 
xI0

+ (1  q) `V1
 
xI1

+RV ;
21This result breaks down if victims display rst-order risk aversion (see Franzoni (2017)).
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where RI and RV are the risk premiums due to the ex-ante uncertainty.
Ex-ante social welfare can be written, therefore, as
W ex ante (d0; d1) = `ex anteI (d0; d1) + n`
ex ante
V (d0; d1)
= qW SL0 (d0) + (1  q)W SL1 (d1) RI   nRV : (8)
As in the previous section, ex-ante social welfare di¤ers from ex-post social welfare.
The ex-ante optimal policy must account for the cost of uncertainty. The following
result applies.
Proposition 2 Liability for harm caused.
a) Damages dc0 should be increased if, and only if,
@RI
@`I0 (x
I
0)
<
@RV
@`V0 (x
V
0 )
;
b) Damages dc1 should be increased if, and only if,
@RI
@`I0 (x
I
0)
<
@RV
@`V0 (x
V
0 )
:
Proof. See Appendix A2.
Proposition 2 mimics Proposition 1. Optimal attenuation requires a modication
of the ex-post optimal policy. Damages should be increased if injurers are subject to a
positive shock while victims are subject to a negative shock (and the other way around).
When parties are subject to shocks with the same sign, attenuation should take care
of the party that benets most from a reduction in ex-ante risk.22
In Appendix A2, I show that optimal damages may be overcompensatory: d0 > h
(or d1 > h): Under risk neutrality, optimal damages are perfectly compensatory: Under
risk aversion, a deviation from the risk-neutral benchmark is desirable, for a better
allocation of risk. In the neighborhood of d0 = d

1 = h; a small change in damages has
no e¤ect on the victims, who are fully insured against harm. So, the relevant impact is
on the risk burden of the injurer. If ex-post risk is what matters most, damages should
be reduced (both d0 and d

1): If ex-ante risk is what matters most - because ex-ante
22In most cases, injurers are likely to bear greater ex-ante uncertainty than victims. For the injurers,
ex-ante uncertainty stems from the variability of precaution costs and liability expenses. For the vic-
tims, ex-ante uncertainty stems from the variability of expected uncompensated harm. So, if damages
are not too far from the harm su¤ered, attenuation is likely to be geared towards the injurers.
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uncertainty is substantial - damages should be overcompensatory in the presence of a
positive shock, and under-compensatory in the presence of a negative shock.
5 Corrective taxation
Let us now suppose that the government relies on corrective taxation to encourage
precaution (or, equivalently, a reduction in emissions). I focus on simple linear taxes:
T0 (x0) = t0 (X   x0) ; and T1 (x1) = t1 (X   x1) :
X captures the "baseline" level of precaution. If the injurer does less thanX; she pays a
tax; if she does more, she gets a subsidy. In the case of an emission tax, X represents the
xed emissions allowance. So, this mechanism also captures a cap-and-trade policy.23
X is assumed to be xed. If X could vary across states, it could be used to provide
perfect insurance to the injurers (with a large X in bad states, and a small X in good
states). If that were the case, the only remaining concern for the policy maker would
be to provide insurance to the victims. In the present model, the latter case can be
captured by assuming that injurers are risk neutral:
Let us focus on state 0. The ex-post payo¤ of the injurer is yI   `I0 (x0) ; where the
cost of harm for the injurer is
`I0 (x0) = c0 (x0) + t0 (X   x0) :
The cost of harm includes precaution costs and the tax payment (or subsidy).
The injurer selects the level of precaution xI0 that minimizes her cost of harm, with
c00
 
xI0

= t0: (9)
23Shavell (2014b) considers the case in which the tax depends on the probability of harm, T0 (x) =
t0p0 (x) ; and victims are risk-neutral. The optimal conventional level of t0 is h; so that T 00 (x) = p
0
0 (x)h:
This formulation mimics the liability for harm case (with injurers insured against liability). Non-linear
taxes are theoretically superior (see Kaplow and Shavell (2002)), but they entail large administrative
costs. The current policy debate focuses on linear taxes and cap-and-trade (possibly with a collar).
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The injurer takes precautions to avoid the tax (or increase the subsidy). We have
@`I0
 
xI0

@t0
=
@`I0
 
xI0

@xI0
@xI0
@t0
+
@`I0
 
xI0

@t0

x0=xI0
= X   x0; (10)
since
@`I0(xI0)
@xI0
= 0: An increase in the tax rate induces the injurer to take additional
precautions, whose costs and benets are perfectly balanced. So, the increase in the
tax impacts the payo¤ of the injurer only by means of the additional tax outlays, which
are positive in the case of a tax (if X > x0) and negative in the case of a subsidy (if
X < x0):
The ex-post cost of harm for a victim is:
`V0
 
xI0

= p0
 
xI0

h+RP V0
 
xI0

;
where p0
 
xI0

h is the expected harm and RP V0
 
xI0

the risk premium attendant with
the harm prospect. If the tax rate t0 increases, injurers take additional precautions,
and the victimss cost of harm decreases.
Ex-post social welfare is equal to the injurers payo¤ plus the victims payo¤ plus
the tax revenue (that can be redistributed to society at large):24
cW0 (t0) = yI   `I0  xI0+ n yV   `V0  xI0+ T0 (x0)
= yI   c0
 
xI0
  T0 (x0) + n yV   `V0  xI0+ T0 (x0)
= yI   c0
 
xI0

+ n

yV   `V0
 
xI0

:
Note that the tax only a¤ects social welfare indirectly, by means of its impact on the
24I assume that the tax revenue is distributed to all members of society (thus, the impact on indi-
vidual incomes is negligible). If the tax revenue were distributed to the victims only, the corrective
taxation regime would resemble the liability regime, except for the fact that the tax is levied on all
injurers and not only on those who happen to cause an accident. So, the tax would provide liability
insurance to the injurers. The tax revenue could alternatively be returned (in a lump-sum fashion)
only to the injurers. In the present model, such an outcome can be mimicked by suitably changing the
benchmark X (so as to bring the net payment of each injurer to zero). This solution would eliminate
the ex-ante uncertainty on the injurersside.
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precaution level xI0:
The optimal conventional tax rate solves:
@cW0 (t0)
@t0
=
@xI0
@t0

c00
 
xI0

+ n`V 00
 
xI0

= 0: (11)
At the ex-post optimum, marginal costs equate marginal benets of precaution. Using
(9), we get: tc0 = c
0
0
 
xI0

=  n`V 00
 
xI0

: Note that if the number of victims increases,
the marginal benet of precaution increases and tc0 increases.
In state 1, by similarity, we have : tc1 = c
0
1
 
xI1

=  n`V 01
 
xI1

(see Figure 2 below).
Let us move to the ex-ante stage. Ex-ante social welfare can be written, going
through the usual steps, as
W ex ante (t0; t1) = qcW0 (t0) + (1  q)cW1 (t1) RI   nRV ; (12)
where RI and RV are the ex-ante risk premiums of injurer and victims, respectively,
due to ex-ante uncertainty. Again, a change in policy a¤ects both ex-post welfare and
the ex-ante risk burden of the parties.
In order to establish in which direction conventional policy should be changed, one
should compare the impact of a change in the tax rate on the risk burdens of injurers
and victims. In contrast to the cases analyzed in the previous sections, here a policy
change impacts the (ex-post) payo¤s of the parties in a non-symmetric way. Fig. 2
illustrates.
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Fig. 2. Corrective taxation.
An increase in the tax a¤ects the tax outlays of the injurer by the amount X  xc0 - the
horizontal shaded area (in this case, the amount X   xc0 is a loss because X > xc0): At
the same time, it increases the cost of harm for the victims by an amount that depends
on the sensitivity of precautions to the tax - the vertical shaded area. If marginal
precaution costs are very steep, a reduction in the tax has a small e¤ect on the victims.
Thus, on the victimsside, what matters is the elasticity of precautions with respect to
the tax rate,
"x0t0 =
@xI0
@t0
tc0
xI0
=
1
c000 (x
I
0)
tc0
xI0
> 0;
(from 9). The following Proposition identies the direction in which the ex-post optimal
policy should be changed.
Proposition 3 Corrective taxation.
a) The tax tc0 should be increased if, and only if,
@RI
@`I0 (x
I
0)
X xI0
xI0
<
@RV
@`V0 (x
I
0)
"x0t0 ;
b) The tax tc1 should be increased if, and only if,
@RI
@`I1 (x
I
1)
X xI1
xI1
<
@RV
@`V1 (x
I
1)
"x1t1 :
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Proof. See Appendix A3.
The inequalities of Proposition 3 are substantially di¤erent from those obtained in
the previous sections. The direction of change of the conventional policy depends, in
addition to the sign of the shocks (positive or negative), on the impact of an increase
in the tax rate on the outlays of the injurer and on the elasticity of precaution.25 If
precautions are relatively inelastic (marginal costs are steep), policy should only focus
on mitigating the risk borne by the injurers (and vice versa).
If the injurer is risk averse and the victims are risk neutral, the tax outlays should
be decreased under a negative shock for the injurer, while they should be increased
under a positive shock.26 The decrease in the tax outlays is obtained by a decrease in
tc0 if X > x
I
0 (tax) and the other way around if X < x
I
0 (subsidy).
If the injurer is risk neutral and victims are risk averse, the tax rate should be
increased under a negative shock for the victims, while it should be decreased under
a positive shock. This case also captures the situation in which the baseline level of
precaution X can be adjusted according to the circumstances.
6 Extensions
 Choice of instrument. The analysis of the previous sections focuses on the optimal
attenuation given the policy instrument. Note that all instruments are equally e¢ cient
when injurers and victims are risk neutral. They di¤er substantially, instead, when
parties are risk averse.
Under regulatory standards, injurers face uncertainty about precaution costs, while
victims bear the risk of harm. Under liability, injurers face uncertainty about precaution
costs and liability exposure, while victims bear the risk of being undercompensated.
Under taxes, injurers face uncertainty about precaution costs and tax payments (if
25Under a cap-and-trade system, a change in the tax is equivalent to a change in the price of the
emission permits.
26This case o¤ers a rationale for the "cost containment" policies advanced in environmental policy
(safety valves, collars, etc.). See Aldy (2017).
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X is xed). Victims bear the risk of harm. These three allocations cannot be easily
compared, except for some special cases.
If injurers are risk neutral and victims risk averse, strict liability with full compen-
sation yields the rst best. Injurers bear all the risk, while victims are perfectly insured.
If victims are risk neutral and injurers are risk averse, regulation and taxation are
likely to fare better.27 Under corrective taxation, if the allowance X is suitably adjusted,
injurers can be fully insured. So, corrective taxation dominates all other instruments.
 Ambiguity aversion. The results of this article show that the optimal policy
should reduce the ex-ante uncertainty for the parties, even when this uncertainty is
about the probability of harm. Thus, parties should be treated as if they were averse
to compound lotteries, even if they are not (in line with expected utility theory).
There is ample empirical evidence that individuals do not always behave in line
with expected utility theory. In particular, if the probabilities with which they deal do
have a "subjective" nature, rather than an "objective" one, then aversion to compound
lotteries tends to arise (this is technically called "ambiguity aversion").28 In Appendix
A5, I show that if victims are averse to ambiguity (in the sense of Klibano¤et al. (2005)),
then the simple rule of Proposition 1 takes on an additional term, and attenuation of
the victimsex-ante uncertainty becomes relatively more desirable.
 Insurance. In the model, parties have no access to private insurance. Would
results change if private insurance were available? The answer tends to be negative.
Insurance policies come with a loading factor, covering administrative costs, usually
in the amount of 30-50% of the premium. Given a positive loading factor, optimal
insurance contracts contain deductibles. Because of this, some risk remains on the
parties. Thus, attenuation remains desirable.
27Appendix A4 develops a simple su¢ cient condition for the dominance of regulation. This condition
states that the payment of damages in addition to precaution costs increases the size of the ex-ante
risk faced by the injurer. Under an Arrow-Pratt approximation, this condition is met if precuation
costs and damages are not negatively correlated.
28See Gilboa and Marinacci (2013) for an introduction to the literature on ambiguity aversion. The
impact of ambiguity aversion on liability law has been explored, among others, by Teitelbaum (2007)
and Franzoni (2017).
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 Countercyclical regulation. Note, nally, that in the model, partiesincome is
kept constant across states. In other words, variations in the partiespayo¤s are due
only to changes in the "fundamentals" (precaution costs and probability of harm). It is
clear that policy decision making could also provide individuals with (partial) insurance
against income uctuations. For instance, regulation could become softer when injurers
are subject to a strong negative income shock while victims are not, and vice versa.29
Here, however, the question of why insurance is not provided through the tax system
becomes more compelling.30
7 Final remarks
The uncertainty of the timing and scope of new legal rules has long been a major cause
for concern in the business community. More recently, this concern has been amplied
by climate change. As the global temperature increases, additional mitigation policies
are likely to be adopted that might cause the dismay of entire industries (and the joy
of others). The scope and timing of these measures, however, remain extremely hard to
predict due to the compound e¤ects of political, natural, and scientic uncertainty (see
IPCC (2014)). Law makers cannot ignore the huge costs produced by such uncertainty.
This paper has investigated a specic tool that can be used to provide insurance to
the parties a¤ected by policy making, at little or no cost. This tool, rst proposed by
Steven Shavell, prescribes that policy decisions be distorted at the margin to attenuate
the ex-ante risk borne by the parties. In the model developed in this paper, the atten-
uation policy is applied to regulatory standards, liability law, and corrective taxation.
In all three cases, attenuation increases social welfare.
29This would represent a form of "countercyclical regulation" (see Masur and Posner (2017)). Fagan
(2017) studies e¢ ciency-enhancing (legal) stabilization rules.
30In a sense, attenuation provides a "local" solution to the insurance issue, as relief is o¤ered by
changing, at the margin, the level of welfare of the parties a¤ected by the policy decision (injurers and
victims). Taxes could provide instead a "global" solution, as they can distribute risk over all members
of society. The global solution tends to be theoretically preferable. It might fail, however, when the
"local" problem is large enough. Correlated risks a¤ecting a large section of the population cannot be
perfectly spread.
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In general, the direction in which conventional policies should be changed depends
on the sign of the shock parties are subject to (negative or positive), the size of the
shock, and their disposition towards risk. These factors interact in a simple way. Their
estimation requires little information. The corrective taxation case is somewhat more
complicated because, here, the direction of change depends on the elasticity of precau-
tion with respect to the tax rate.
The analysis of decision making under uncertainty developed in this paper is com-
plementary to the classic analysis in Weitzman (1974)s tradition (at the basis of current
environmental policy). The latter emphasizes the costs of making policy decisions when
the information is not yet available; my analysis emphasizes the costs attendant with
an unpredictable evolution of economic and environmental factors. In the latter per-
spective, the comparison of the di¤erent policy instruments is based not on their ability
to contain the costs of mistakes, but on their ability to provide parties with partial
insurance against uncertainty. Depending on the partiesability to tolerate risk, and
the size of the risk they are subject to, one instrument or another may be preferable.
The analysis of this paper leaves many important issues aside. Among these, I
should mention that it does not consider durable precautions (which are relevant if
uncertainty unfolds gradually and the law is subject to repeated changes). By contrast,
given its basic nature, it can be applied to a very large number of instances: essentially,
to all policy decisions based on cost-benet analysis.
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Appendix
A1. Regulatory standards. The optimal standards are obtained by maximizing the
expected utility of the injurer given the expected utility of the victims (there are nV =nI = n
victims per injurer), that is from31
max
x0;x1
EUI (x0; x1) = qu (yI   nt  c0 (x0)) + (1  q)u (yI   nt  c1 (x1)) (13)
subject to
EUV (x0; x1) = q [(1  p0 (x0)) v (yV + t) + p0 (x0) v (yV + t  h)]+
(1  q) [(1  p1 (x1)) v (yV + t) + p1 (x1) v (yV + t  h)] (14)
= q
hdEUV0 (x0)i+ (1  q) hdEU1V (x1)i = r: (15)
yI and yV are, respectively, the income levels of injurer and victims, r is the reference expected
utility level of each victim, and t a money transfer from the injurer to each victim (which
removes distributional concerns from the picture). The transfer takes place before uncertainty
unravels.
Let us focus on the victimsexpected utility. Figure 3 illustrates (in the diagram the index
V is omitted).
31I am grateful to Steven Shavell for having encouraged me to formalize this part of the
paper.
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Fig. 3. Victims utility function.
When the probability of harm is p0 (x0) ; the expected utility of the victim is dEUV0 (x0) ;
and the certainty equivalent is yV   `0 (x0) = yV   p0 (x0)h   RP V0 (x0) : The certainty
equivalent includes the expected loss p0 (x0)h and the risk premium RP V0 (x0) due to the
uncertainty about the occurrence of harm: When the probability of harm is p1 (x1) ; the
expected utility is dEUV1 (x1) ; and the certainty equivalent is yV   `1 (x1) = yV   p1 (x1)  
RP V1 (x1) :
From (14), it is clear that the ex-ante expected utility EUV (x0; x1) is equal to the expected
utility associated to the compound probability of harm p = qp0 (x0) + (1  q) p1 (x1). The
certainty equivalent of EUV (x0; x1) is yV   z:
Figure 3 shows that yV   z can also be obtained as the certainty equivalent of a lottery in
which the victims income is yV   `0 (x0) with probability q; and yV   `1 (x1) with probability
1 q: Specically, yV  z = yV  q`0 (x0)  (1  q) `1 (x1) RV ; where RV is the risk premium
due to the ex-ante uncertainty about the probability of harm. Note that RV increases if
`0 decreases and if `1 increases. Given `1 and `0, RV increases if v is subject to a concave
29
monotone transformation.
In view of the previews observations, constraint (15) can be reformulated as
EUV (x0; x1) = v(yV + t  q`0 (x0)  (1  q) `1 (x1) RV ) = r; (16)
or
yV + t  q`0 (x0)  (1  q) `1 (x1) RV = v 1 (r) : (17)
Also the payo¤ of the injurer can be formulated in terms of a certainty equivalent. Maximiza-
tion (13) can be written as
max
x0;x1
EUI (x0; x1) = u (yI   nt  qc0 (x0)  (1  q) c1 (x1) RI) (18)
subject to eq. (17) ;
where RI is the risk premium due to the uncertainty about the precaution costs. Substituting
t from (17) into (18) yields (omitting arguments):
max
x0;x1
u
 
yI   qc0   (1  q) c1  RI + n
 
yV   q`0   (1  q) `1  RV   v 1 (r)

;
which is equivalent to
max
x0;x1
yI   qc0   (1  q) c1  RI + n
 
yV   q`0   (1  q) `1  RV   v 1 (r)

; (19)
since u is a positive monotone transformation of its argument (the slope of u (f (x)) has the
same sign as the slope of f (x)):
Since, v 1 (r) is a constant, (19) is equivalent to
maxx0;x1W
ex ante (x0; x1) = yI   qc0   (1  q) c1  RI + n [yV   q`0   (1  q) `1  RV ]
= q [yI   c0 + yV   q`0] + (1  q) [yI   c1 + n (yV   (1  q) `1)] RI   nRV
= qcW0 (x0) + (1  q)cW1 (x1) RI   nRV ;
where cW0 (x0) and cW1 (x1) are the ex-post welfare levels (as in eq.(6) of Section 3).
The assumptions about the cost functions and the probabilities of harm guarantee that the
optimal standards lie in the interior. I further assume thatW (x0; x1) is strictly quasi-convex.
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We have
@W ex ante (x0; x1)
@x0
= q
@cW0 (x0)
@x0
  @RI
@c0 (x0)
c00 (x0)  n
@RV
@`0 (x0)
`00 (x0) :
At x0 = xc0; x1 = x
c
1; we have
@cW0(x0)
@x0
= 0 and c00 (xc0) =  n`00 (xc0) (from 3), so:
@W ex ante (xc0; xc1)
@x0
> 0, @RI
@c0 (xc0)
<
@RV
@`0 (xc0)
: (20)
Similarly, we get
@W ex ante (xc0; xc1)
@x1
> 0, @RI
@c1 (xc1)
<
@RV
@`1 (xc1)
: (21)
A2. Optimal damages. Let us consider the problem of Section 4. We have
`I0 (x0) = c0 (x0) + p0 (x0)nd0 +RP
I
0 (nd0) ;
where RP I0 (d0) is the risk premium attendant with the prospect of bearing liability nd0 with
probability p0 (x0). The level of care xI0 is decided by the injurer to minimize her cost of
harm: xI0 = argminx0
 
`I0 (x0)

; and thus32
c00 (x
c
0) =  

p00 (x0)nd0 +
@RP I0 (nd0)
@x0

:
The costs of harm for each victim is:
`V0
 
xI0

= p0
 
xI0

(h  d0) +RP V0 (h  d0) ;
where RP V0 (h  d0) is the risk premium attendant with the prospect of bearing uncompen-
sated harm h d0 with probability p0
 
xI0

: One can easily see that the cost of harm increases
if h d0 increases and if p0
 
xI0

decreases. Furthermore, it can be shown (using the denition
of the risk premium), that RP V0 (h  d0) = 0 and @RP
V
0 (h d0)
@(h d0) = 0 if d0 = h:
The optimal conventional level of damages can be found by maximizing social welfare (per
32The impact of an increase in nd0 on xI0 is generally ambiguous (it is positive, however, if
risk-aversion is not decreasing in income - see Sweeney and Beard (1992)).
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injurer):
WSL0 (d0) = yI   `I0
 
xI0

+ n

yV   `V0
 
xI0

:
We have
WSL0 (d0)
@d0
=  @`
I
0
 
xI0

@xI0
@xI0
@d0
  @`
I
0
 
xI0

@d0

x=xI0
  n@`
V
0
 
xI0

@xI0
@xI0
@d0
  n @`
V
0
 
xI0

@d0

x=xI0
with
@`I0(xI0)
@xI0
= 0 because of the optimality of xI0:
Note that
@`I0
 
xI0

@d0

x=xI0
= p0
 
xI0

n+
@RP I0 (nd0)
@d0
;
@`V0
 
xI0

@d0

x=xI0
=  p0
 
xI0

+
@RP V0 (nd0)
@d0
and
@`V0
 
xI0

@xI0
@xI0
@d0
=
@xI0
@d0
@p0
 
xI0

@xI0
"
h  d0 + @RP
V
0 (h  d0)
@p0
 
xI0
 # :
Thus, upon simplication,
WSL0 (d0)
@d0
=  @RP
I
0 (nd0)
@d0
  n@RP
V
0 (nd0)
@d0
  n@x
I
0
@d0
@p0
 
xI0

@xI0
"
h  d0 + @RP
V
0 (h  d0)
@p0
 
xI0
 # :
For d0 = h; the last two terms boil down to nil. An increase in damages does not a¤ect
the payo¤ of the victims because: i) they can perfectly bear small risks (for very small losses,
risk-averse agents behave as risk neutral ones), ii) they do not su¤er from an increase in the
probability of harm because they are perfectly compensated.
Thus,
WSL0 (h)
@d0
=  @RP
I
0 (nh)
@d0
< 0: (22)
This proves that optimal conventional damages are under-compensatory (dc0 < h). The same
applies to dc1:
Let us now see if the same argument applies in the presence of ex-ante uncertainty. From
(8), we get:
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@W ex ante (d0; d1)
@d0
= q
WSL0 (d0)
@d0
  @RI
@`I0
 
xI0
 @`I0  xI0
@d0
  n @RV
@`V0
 
xV0
 @`V0  xI0
@d0
:
For d0 = h; we have
@`V0
 
xI0

@d0
= 0. Thus, using (22) ;
@W ex ante (h; d1)
@d0
< 0 ()  q@RP
I
0 (nh)
@d0
  @RI
@`I0
 
xI0
 @`I0  xI0
@d0
< 0
()   @RI
@`I0
 
xI0
 p0  xI0n+ @RP I0 (nh)@d0

< q
@RP I0 (nh)
@d0
: (23)
with p0
 
xI0

n+
@RP I0 (nh)
@d0
> 0:
Inequality (23) might not be met. In particular, if state 0 represents the good state for
the injurer (i.e., `I0
 
xI0

< `I1
 
xI1

), so that @RI
@`I0(xI0)
< 0; and it occurs with small probability
(small q); then over-compensatory damages are optimal.
A3. Optimal corrective tax. Given the optimal conventional tax rates tc0 and t
c
1; we get
(from 12):
@W ex ante (tc0; tc1)
@t0
= q
@cW0 (t0)
@t0
  @RI
@`I0
 
xI0
 @`I0  xI0
@t0
  n @RV
@`V0
 
xI0
 @`V0  xI0
@t0
:
Thus, from (10); (10) and (11) :
@W ex ante (tc0; tc1)
@t0
> 0, @RI
@`I0
 
xI0
  X   xI0 <   @RV@`V0  xI0 @xI0@t0 n`V 00  xI0,
@RI
@`I0
 
xI0
  X   xI0 < @RV@`V0  xI0 @xI0@t0 tc0 , @RI@`I0  xI0 X xI0xI0 < @RV@`V0  xI0"x0t0 :
A4. Choice of instrument. Let us rst compare regulation and corrective taxation. Under
regulation, ex-ante social welfare is:
W ex antereg
 
xR0 ; x
R
1

= yI   qc0
 
xR0
  (1  q) c1  xR1  RregI (24)
+ n

yV   q`V0
 
xR0
  (1  q) `V1  xR1  RregV  : (25)
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Under taxation, ex-ante social welfare is
W ex antetax
 
xT0 ; x
T
1

= yI   qc0
 
xT0
  (1  q) c1  xT1  RtaxI
+n

yV   q`V0
 
xT0
  (1  q) `V1  xT1  RtaxV  : (26)
Suppose that, under regulation, the policymaker selects standards equal to the level of pre-
caution arising under optimal taxes. Upon simplication, we get:
W ex antereg
 
xT0 ; x
T
1

> W ex antetax
 
xT0 ; x
T
1
 () RregI < RtaxI :
Note that, here, victims are not a¤ected by the instrument choice. The two ex-ante risk
premiums, RregI and R
tax
I ; can di¤er for a variety or reasons, including the net income level
available to injurers. To remove income e¤ects, let us consider an Arrow-Pratt second order
approximation. We get:
RregI < R
tax
I () V ar (c) < V ar (c+ T )
() V ar (c) < V ar (c) + V ar (T ) + 2Cov (c; T )
() Cov (c; T ) >  1
2
V ar (T ) :
The last inequality is surely met if precaution costs and tax payments are non negatively corre-
lated. Under this condition, W ex antereg
 
xT0 ; x
T
1

> W ex antetax
 
xT0 ; x
T
1

: So a fortiori, regulation
dominates if the standards can be optimally set.
Let us now compare regulation and liability. Under liability, ex-ante social welfare is
(omitting arguments)
W ex anteliab (d

0; d

1) = yI   q
 
c0 + p0nd

0 +RP
I
0
  (1  q)  c1 + p1nd1 +RP I1  RliabI
+n

yV   q
 
p0 (h  d0) +RP V0
  (1  q)  p1 (h  d1) RP V1  RliabV  ; (27)
where (d0; d1) are the optimal damages.
Regulation and liability generate risks of di¤erent types, both on injurers and victims, so
a general comparison is hard to come by. If injurers are risk neutral and victims risk averse,
strict liability with full compensation provides victims with full insurance and it yields the
rst best. Let us consider the case in which victims are risk neutral and injurers risk averse.
Suppose now that the levels of precaution xL0 ; x
L
1 arising under optimal damages are used as
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standards in the regulation regime. We get
W ex antereg
 
xL0 ; x
L
1

> W ex anteliab (d

0; d

1) ()
RregI < qRP
I
0 + (1  q)RP I1 +RliabI :
A su¢ cient condition for the latter inequality to hold is: RregI < R
liab
I : In other words, the
payment of damages (under liability) in addition to precaution costs increases the ex-ante risk
borne by the injurer. Using a second order approximation, we get
RregI < R
liab
I () V ar (c) < V ar (c+ pd+RPI)
() V ar (c) < V ar (c) + V ar (pd+RPI) + 2Cov(c; pd+RPI);
() V ar (pd+RPI) + 2Cov(c; pd+RPI) > 0:
So, if Cov(c; pd + RPI) > 0; we know that R
reg
I < R
liab
I and regulation with constrained
standards dominates liability. If the standards can be optimally set, the dominance is even
stricter.
Using a similar argument, it can be shown that, with risk neutral victims, taxation (with
an exogenous allowance X) dominates liability if
RtaxI < R
liab
I () V ar (c+ T ) < V ar (c+ pd+RPI)
() V ar (c) + V ar (T ) + 2Cov (c; T ) < V ar (c) + V ar (pd+RPI) + 2Cov(c; pd+RPI);
() V ar (T ) + 2Cov (c; T ) < V ar (pd+RPI) + 2Cov(c; pd+RPI):
Both taxation and liability produce variance that goes beyond precaution costs. In the latter
inequality, the term on the LHS heavily depends on how the baseline level of precaution X is
xed. Taxation dominates if: net tax payments (or subsidies) are small (and so presumably
is their variance), tax payments are negatively correlated with precaution costs, liability costs
are large (and so presumably their variance), and liability costs are positively correlated with
precaution costs.
A5. Ambiguity aversion (regulatory standards). There are several models of ambiguity
aversion. Here, I use one of the most general, the smooth model of Klibano¤ et al. (2005),
which posits that parties are averse to mean-preserving spreads of their beliefs.
The victimsex-ante welfare can be written as
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V A = q'
dEUV0 (x0)+ (1  q)'dEU1V (x1) ; (28)
where ' is a concave monotone function. As with standard risk aversion, the concave transfor-
mation implies that the welfare derived from the two expected utilities is less than the mean
value of the expected utilities. This implies that to know (or to conjecture) that the probability
of harm will take value p0 (x0) with probability q and value p1 (x1) with probability (1  q) is
worse than knowing for certain that the probability of harm will be qp0 (x0)+(1  q) p1 (x1).
From (28), the uncertainty premium due to ambiguity, RA; should meet
'

qdEUV0 (x0) + (1  q) dEU1V (x1) RA = V A:
So, the level of welfare achieved by the victims can be seen as (a monotone transformation
of) conventional expected utility minus an ambiguity premium. The ambiguity premium RA
decreases if the wedge between `0 (x0) and `1 (x1) decreases.
In view of (16), the victims welfare can be also written as
V A = '
 
yV   q`0 (x0)  (1  q) `1 (x1) RV  RA

:
So, the maximization of the welfare function V A is equivalent to the maximization of the
ex-ante certainty equivalent V ex ante:
V ex ante = yV   q`0 (x0)  (1  q) `1 (x1) RV  RA:
= yV   b`ex anteV (x0; x1) :
Going through the same steps as before (Appendix A1), we get that the optimal ex-ante
policy should maximize;
W ex ante (x0; x1) = nI

yI   `ex anteI (x0; x1)

+ nV
h
yI   b`ex anteV (x0; x1)i
= nI [yI   qc0 (x0)  (1  q) c1 (x1) RI ] + nV

yI   q`0 (x0)  (1  q) `1 (x1) RV  RA

= qcW0 (x0) + (1  q)cW1 (x1)  nIRI   nV  RV +RA :
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Thus
@W ex ante (x0; x1)
@x0
= qcW 00 (x0)  nI @RI@c0 (x0)c00 (x0)  nV @
 
RV +R
A

@`0 (x0)
`00 (x0) :
At x0 = xc0; x1 = x
c
1; (using cW 00 (x0)= 0 and nI c00 (xc0) =  nV `00 (xc0)); we get
@W ex ante (xc0; xc1)
@x0
< 0, @RI
@c0 (xc0)
>
@RV
@`0 (xc0)
+
@RA
@`0 (xc0)
: (29)
Both RV and RA increase as the wedge between `0 (x0) and `1 (x1) increases. So, the adden-
dum
@RA
@`0 (xc0)
just amplies the benet of uncertainty attenuation for the victims.
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